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Background 
• NOT an expert in innovation indicators 
• Previously worked on science indicators 
• Helped pioneer science indicators for policy use 
• Study for UK Gov’t & NSF on government funding of 
academic research 
•  As Editor of Research Policy, overview of field of 
innovation studies 
• Have written about dangers of innovation studies 
failing to keep up with  
• changing world 
• changing nature of innovation 
• Aim = to set the scene rather than provide answers! 
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Emergence of the knowledge society 
• Live in era of 
• globalisation (+ global problems) 
• growing competition 
• increasing complexity 
• Increased emphasis on innovation and on science 
and technology 
• Innovation 
• taking place in different sectors (not just manufacturing) 
• different organisations (not just firms) 
• taking different forms (not just technological) 
•  Are current innovation indicators adequate? 
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Observations on indicators 
• All indicators are partial 
• In world of social sc & policy, no perfect measures 
• Indicators only capture certain aspects of phenomenon 
and only to a limited extent 
• ‘Experts’ often tend to lose sight of such caveats 
 e.g. assume patents ‘measure’ innovation 
 But patents relate more to invention than innovation 
 Only used in certain sectors/technologies/types of innovation 
• For a given indicator, need conceptual clarity re 
what aspects of a given phenomenon it captures and 
what it neglects 
• e.g. bibliometric indicators – relate to only one form of 
scientific output (publishing) 
• Citations – relate to impact (on peers) rather than quality 
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Observations on indicators 
• Every indicator is based on many assumptions 
• Most implicit 
• Rarely subject to critical scrutiny 
• Validity of those assumptions varies with circumstances 
and over time 
•  Statistics and indicators – more an art than a science! 
• Statisticians and indicator producers (+ many users) 
tend to be inherently conservative 
• Prefer long time-series even if comes at comes at cost of 
growing distance from ‘reality’ 
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‘Fighting the last war’? 
• In rapidly changing world, danger that STI indicators 
failing to keep up 
• The way we conceptualise, define & measure 
‘innovation’ reflects dominant forms of innovation 
when field of innovation studies was established in 
1960s-80s, when most innovation was 
• technology-based – drawing on S&T 
• conducted by private firms 
• in the manufacturing sector – especially ‘hi tech’ mfg 
• Innovation then captured (reasonably) via e.g. 
• R&D spending 
• No’s of QSEs 
• Patents 
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‘Dark innovation’ 
• But now, a lot of innovative activity 
• not technological 
• not based on R&D 
• not reflected in patents 
• not in manufacturing sector 
• Often largely ‘invisible’ with conventional indicators 
• Cf. cosmology – much of universe invisible – 
consists of dark matter or dark energy 
• ‘Dark innovation’ – i.e. largely invisible with current 
innovation indicators 
• Challenge = to conceptualise, define and devise 
methods for measuring ‘dark innovation’ (Martin, 
2016) 8 
Opportunities in era of ‘big data’  
• Compared with situation 3-4 decades ago, now far 
more & varied data available, including ‘big data’ 
• Opens up opportunities for developing new 
innovation indicators 
• But there are several dangers to be aware of 
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Indicator dangers 
• The drunk and the lamp-post 
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Indicator dangers 
• The drunk and the lamp-post 
• Temptation among indicator producers to focus on 
phenomena and characteristics where there is ‘light’ 
• i.e. data one can readily use to construct an indicator 
• Neglect of less easily measured (or non-measurable) 
aspects, even if equally or more important 
• Analogy with drunk looking for lost keys under the 
lamp-post (“because that’s where the light/data is”) 
   
Indicator dangers 
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• The ‘Einstein’ dictum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Correct attribution – Cameron (1963) 
Indicator dangers 
• The McNamara Fallacy 
• “Making the measurable important rather than 
attempting to make the important measureable” 
(Rowntree, 1987) 
• e.g. body counts or tons of bombs dropped to measure 
‘success’ in Vietnam War 
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The McNamara Fallacy 
• “The first step is to measure whatever can be easily 
measured.  
 This is OK as far as it goes.  
• The second step is to disregard that which can't be easily 
measured or to give it an arbitrary quantitative value.  
 This is artificial and misleading.  
• The third step is to presume that what can't be measured 
easily really isn't important.  
 This is blindness.  
• The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured 
really doesn't exist.  
 This is suicide.” 
• (Yankelovich, 1972 – but often attributed to Handy, 1994) 
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Indicator dangers 
• The McNamara Fallacy 
• “Making the measurable important rather than 
attempting to make the important measureable” 
(Rowntree, 1987) 
• e.g. body counts or tons of bombs dropped to measure 
‘success’ in Vietnam War 
• Related to AN Whitehead’s ‘Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness’ – i.e. “the error of mistaking the 
abstract for the concrete” 
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Indicator dangers 
• Goodhart’s Law  
• Once a variable is adopted as a policy target, it 
rapidly loses its ability to ‘capture’ phenomenon 
or characteristic supposedly being measured 
• When you measure a system, you change it 
• cf. Heisenberg Principle (also Hawthorne effect) 
• Once an innovation indicator adopted as part of 
a policy,  
• changes in behaviour with ‘game-playing’ to 
maximise score/benefit 
• perverse incentives 
• unintended consequences 
Indicator dangers 
• Excessive costs 
• Fundamental boundary condition – benefits > costs 
• Development of indicators comes at significant cost 
• Setting up 
• Regular updating 
• ‘Costs’ of unintended consequences (e.g. game-playing) 
• Various forces encouraging over-elaboration 
• New public management, accountability, audit society 
• Zeal of indicator developers (+ criticisms of existing 
indicators) 
• In some cases, costs may come to exceed benefits 
• e.g. excessive application of bibliometric indicators  
more research misconduct? (cf. VW saga) 
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Conclusions 
• In a knowledge-intensive society, innovation 
increasingly important 
• Growing variety of forms and locations 
• Current innovation indicators reflect primary forms 
of innovation of previous decades 
• Much innovative activity currently invisible or ‘dark’ 
• Need new indicators to capture 
• But in era of easily available or ‘big’ data, beware  
• the temptation to search only under the ‘lamp-post’ 
• the McNamara fallacy 
• subsequent game-playing and unintended consequences 
• Remember – benefits of indicators must be > costs 
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